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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to present a simple but flexible theoretical model of the adjudication process that can be 
used to derive implications of various hypotheses about the adjudicators and litigants for the trial win rates, appeal 
rates and the reversal rates. Such a model can serve as a helpful tool for guiding empirical work on attitudes and 
competency of adjudicators and litigants. We use the model to study how the appeal and reversal rates are affected by 
the litigants'' perception that the trial court has a pro-plaintiff bias. We find that such a perception can result in higher 
appeal and reversal rates for the defendants relative to the plaintiffs, a pattern that is observed in the data.
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     1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to present a simple but exible theoretical model of the
adjudication process that can be used to derive implications of various hypotheses about the
adjudicators and litigants for the trial win rates, appeal rates and the reversal rates. Such a
model can serve as a helpful tool for guiding empirical work on attitudes and competency of
adjudicators and litigants. We rst present the model and then illustrate its use by studying
how the appeal and reversal rates are aected by the litigants' perception that the trial court
has a pro-plainti bias.
We nd that such a perception can result in higher appeal and reversal rates for defendants
relative to plaintis,1 a pattern that is observed in the Supplemental Survey of Civil Appeals,
2001 data (see Appendix B for the relevant descriptive statistics). Based on this pattern
and on an informal discussion of alternative hypotheses, Clermont and Eisenberg (2001)
and Eisenberg and Heise (2009) conclude that the appellate courts are more likely to decide
against plaintis because they incorrectly perceive the trial court as having a pro-plainti
bias (which they refer to as \plaintiphobia"). By showing that the said pattern is consistent
with another hypothesis, our analysis suggests that the conclusion of \plaintiphobia" drawn
by these two papers does not necessarily follow.
While in this paper we only consider the eect of litigants' perception of trial court bias
on the appeal rates and reversal rates, our model can also be easily adapted to study the
implications of many other commonly held opinions about the adjudicators and litigants.
Some examples are: allegations that juries have a pro-plainti bias, that juries are more
likely to make errors than trial judges or that trial judges receive a more pro-plainti case
mix compared to juries.
Cameron and Kornhauser (2006), Daughety and Reinganum (2000), Shavell (1995, 2006) and
Spitzer and Talley (2000) also provide models of the adjudication process involving both trial
and appeal. The objective of these scholars, however, is quite dierent from our objective.
We are interested in deriving the implications of various opinions about the adjudicators and
litigants for trial win rates, appeal rates and reversal rates. Cameron and Kornhauser (2006)
and Shavell (1995) are concerned with the optimality of the judicial structure. Daughety and
Reinganum (2000) explore whether a litigant's decision to bring an appeal carries information
that can improve the appellate court's decision when the litigant knows that the appellate
court would draw an inference about the correct legal rule based on her decision to appeal.
There are many dierences between our model and those in these papers. None of these
papers allows for heterogeneity in the cost of appeal, nor do they allow for the trial court's
decision to aect litigants' beliefs about the correct outcome. Hence, the litigants' perception
of trial court bias plays no role in these models. Also, these models do not conduct a
comparative analysis of plaintis and defendants.
1In our model, the perception by the litigants that the trial court has a pro-plainti bias unambiguously
increases the defendant appeal rate and decreases the plainti appeal rate. The impact on the reversal rates,
however, is ambiguous. It depends upon how the perception of the bias aects the beliefs of the defendants
and plaintis.
1The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present our model, in Section 3 we derive
the expressions for trial win rates, appeal rates and reversal rates and compare these across
defendants and plaintis both when litigants do and do not perceive trial court as being
pro-plainti. Section 4 concludes. The proofs are in Appendix A and descriptive statistics
are in Appendix B.
2. The Model
Consider a situation where risk neutral litigants go to a trial. Assume that in any particular
trial there are only two possible verdicts, a correct and an incorrect verdict. The dispute
could be about the liability of the defendant, in which case the two verdicts are whether the
defendant is innocent or guilty. Alternatively, the issue could be about the level of damages
and the two verdicts are whether the damages are low or high. We should clarify that the
correctness of the verdict may not always correspond to the truth in a particular case. For
example, in a particular case it may be socially optimal to nd a defendant guilty only if at
least two of the three pieces of evidence | e1;e2 and e3 | are available.2 In a case of this
type, if only one piece of evidence, say e1, is available then by a correct verdict we mean
the verdict of \innocent", even if the defendant is actually guilty. Let S denote the state of
nature. If the correct outcome, as dened here, is that the defendant be deemed innocent
(resp. guilty) or that the damages awarded be low (resp. high), then S = S0 (resp. S = S1).
Let r (resp. 1   r) denote the fraction of disputes in which S = S0 (resp. S = S1).
The Trial Court: The objective of the trial court is to render the correct decision, as
dened above. Let VT denote the trial court verdict. With some abuse of notation, let
VT = S0 (resp. VT = S1) when the trial court renders a verdict in favor of the defendant
(resp. plainti). Let tij = Pr(VT = SijS = Sj), (i;j 2 f0;1g), denote the probability that
an unbiased trial court renders a verdict of Si when the state of nature is Sj. Note that
t10 = 1   t00 and t01 = 1   t11. We assume that t00 > 1=2, t11 > 1=2 and t00 = t11.
Assumption tii > 1=2; i 2 f0;1g says that an unbiased trial court's accuracy is greater than
what it would be if it made a decision based solely on, say, a toss of a coin. Assumption t00
= t11 says that the probability that an unbiased trial court decides in favor of the defendant,
when that is the correct outcome, is the same as the probability that the trial court nds in
favor of the plainti, when that is the correct outcome.3;4
2This may be socially optimal, for example, because considering only one piece of evidence sucient
to render a guilty verdict may result in many actually innocent defendants being deemed guilty and the
likelihood of only one piece of evidence being present when the defendant is actually guilty may be relatively
low.
3Note that this assumption is not saying that the probability of nding a defendant guilty when he is
truly guilty is the same as probability of nding a defendant innocent when he is truly innocent. These
probabilities may depend on the evidentiary standard. For example, in case of a strong evidentiary standard
such as \beyond a resonable doubt", t11 may be much smaller than t00. What assumption t00 = t11 is saying
is that the likelihood that an unbiased trial court will correctly render a guilty verdict is the same as the
likelihood that an unbiased trial court will correctly render an innocent verdict.
4This representation of the trial court decision making can be easily modied to account for trial court
bias or competency. For example, if the trial court has a pro-plainti bias, then we can dene tB
0j = t0j   j
and tB
1j = t1j + j for j 2 f0;1g, where j represents the extent of the bias. The eect of dierences in
competency can be investigated by allowing t00 and t11 to increase or decrease together.
2The Appellate Court: As in the case of trial court, the appellate court's objective is to
render the correct decision. Assume that the appellate court engages in a de-novo review of
the trial court decision.5 That is, it makes its decision solely based on the evidence; it does
not consider the trial court's verdict. Let VA denote the appellate court verdict. With some
abuse of notation, let VA = S0 (resp. VA = S1) when the appellate court renders a verdict
in favor of the defendant (resp. plainti). Let aij = Pr(VA = SijS = Sj), (i;j 2 f0;1g). We
assume that the accuracy of the appellate court's decision is such that a00 > 1=2, a11 > 1=2
and a00 = a11. These assumptions are similar to those made in the case of the trial court.
The Litigants: We only consider the litigants' decision after the trial court renders its
verdict. We treat the decision to go to trial as exogenous. We assume that the losing litigant
appeals whenever the expected gain from appeal exceeds the cost of appeal. Let q0
D (resp.
q0
P) denote the defendant's (resp. plainti's) belief that the state is S0 when it is, in fact, S0.
Let q1
D (resp. q1
P) denote the defendant's (resp. plainti's) belief that the state is S0 when it
is S1. After learning of the trial court decision, both plaintis and defendants update their
beliefs about S. For i;j 2 f0;1g, let ^ q
ij
D (resp. ^ q
ij
P ) denote the defendant's (resp. plainti's)
posterior belief that the state is S0 when it is, in fact, Sj and the trial court verdict, VT, is
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Assumption (A.1) says that a trial court decision in the plainti's favor decreases the defen-
dant's belief that the state is S0. Assumption (A.2) says that a trial court decision in the
defendant's favor increases the plainti's belief that the state is S0.6
If the defendants (resp. the plaintis) perceive the trial court as biased, then their posterior
beliefs are denoted by ^ q
ijB
D (resp. ^ q
ijB
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Assumptions (A.1)-(A.4) allow for the possibility that the extent of change in the litigants'
beliefs, following the trial court's decision, can be dierent when the litigants perceive the









P for i 2 f0;1g: This says that the defendants (resp.
plaintis) give a smaller (resp. greater) weight to a trial court's decision in favor of the
plainti (resp. defendant) when they perceive the trial court as having a pro-plainti bias.7
5This assumption is also made by Shavell (1995) and Daughety and Reinganum (2000). Further, it can
be shown that a Bayesian model of the appellate court (where the appellate court updates its beliefs about
the state of nature, S, based on its own signal about S and the trial court's decision) gives the same result.
Proof is available from authors upon request.
6An alternative way of modeling the updating of beliefs is to assume standard Bayesian updating where,






Dt10 + (1   q0
D)t11). Note, however, that this does not capture the fact that the
updated beliefs would also reect any new information discovered by the litigants during the trial. The form
of updating that we assume can be considered as a shortcut to a more elaborate model of belief-updating
that accounts for discovery of any new information during the trial.








P are reasonable only if our earlier
assumption about the court's accuracy, tii > 1=2 for i 2 f0;1g, also holds. If tii < 1=2, (A.1)-(A.4)
3Let H0 (resp. H1) denote the damages awarded by the trial court when it decides in the
defendant's (resp. the plainti's) favor. If the dispute is about liability then H0 = 0, and if
it is about the level of damages, for example, whether punitive damages should be imposed
or not, then H0 can be positive. In any case, H0 < H1. Let H = H1   H0. Also, assume
that the litigants are aware of the accuracy of the appellate court's decision, which we have
referred to as aij (i;j 2 f0;1g). From these assumptions, it follows that if the state is Si
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D)a01)H (1)
when he perceives the trial court as unbiased and,
EG
iB
D = (^ q
1iB
D a00 + (1   ^ q
1iB
D )a01)H (2)
when he perceives the trial court as biased. Similarly, if the state is Si (i 2 f0;1g) and the
plainti loses in the trial court, then her expected gain from an appeal is,
EG
i
P = (^ q
0i
P a10 + (1   ^ q
0i
P )a11)H (3)
when she perceives the trial court as unbiased and,
EG
iB
P = (^ q
0iB
P a10 + (1   ^ q
0iB
P )a11)H (4)
when she perceives the trial court as biased. The losing litigant compares the expected gain
from appeal with the cost of appeal and les an appeal whenever the former is higher.
To focus on how a perception of the trial court bias aects the appeal and reversal rates, we
assume that there are no dierences in other factors that may inuence these rates, such as
in competency or in the cost of appeal across plaintis and defendants. Denote by F() the
distribution of the litigants' cost of appeal. Then the probability of appeal given a defendant









P)) when the state is S1. Also assume
(A.5) q0
D = 1   q1
P and q1







Assumption (A.5) says that the prior belief of the defendant that he should win the trial,
when that is the correct (resp. not the correct) outcome, is the same as the prior belief of the
plainti that she should win the trial when that is the correct (resp. not the correct) outcome.
The rst equality in Assumption (A.6) states that, when the trial court correctly rules against
the defendant, he adjusts his belief by a magnitude that is equal to the adjustment made by
the plainti when the trial court correctly rules against her. The second equality pertains
to adjustments when the trial court rules incorrectly and can be similarly explained.
3. Implications for Trial Win Rates, Appeal Rates and Reversal Rates
We rst show that if the litigants do not perceive the trial court to be pro-plainti, and if
the case-mix at the trial level is symmetric (neither pro-plainti nor pro-defendant), then





























D. That is, when
the trial court is more likely to be incorrect than correct, its decision in the plainti's favor will result in
an upward adjustment in the defendant's belief that the state is S0. Moreover, this increase is likely to be
larger when the defendant believes that the trial court has a pro-plainti bias.
4both the plaintis and the defendants have the same appeal and reversal rates. With this
result as the benchmark, we then evaluate how the appeal and reversal rates are aected
by litigants' perception that the trial court has a pro-plainti bias, and discuss conditions
under which this perception results in the pattern observed in the Supplemental Survey of
Civil Appeals data. Let us rst derive the expressions for these rates.
Trial Win Rates: The defendants' trial win rate is rt00 + (1   r)t01. In fraction r (resp.
1   r) of cases, the correct outcome is in the defendants' (resp. plaintis') favor; of these
cases, the trial court decides fraction t00 (resp. t01) in the defendants' favor. Hence, of all
the cases, fraction rt00 + (1   r)t01 are decided in the defendant's favor. Plaintis' trial win
rate can be similarly determined and is given by rt10 + (1   r)t11.
Appeal Rates: The defendants' appeal rate (of the cases that the defendants lose, the
fraction in which they appeal) when the trial court is unbiased and when the litigants perceive
no bias is given by
Pr(D appealjD loss) = [rt10F(EG
0
D) + (1   r)t11F(EG
1
D)]=[rt10 + (1   r)t11]: (5)
The numerator is the joint probability of the defendant losing and appealing the trial court
outcome and the denominator is the marginal probability of the defendant losing a case.
The plaintis' appeal rate (of the cases that the plaintis lose, the fraction in which they
appeal) in the absence of any actual or perceived bias is:
Pr(P appealjP loss) = [rt00F(EG
0
P) + (1   r)t01F(EG
1
P)]=[rt00 + (1   r)t01]: (6)
If the trial court is unbiased but the litigants believe that there is a pro-plainti bias then
the appeal rates of the defendants and plaintis are
Pr(D appealjD loss) = [rt10F(EG
0B
D ) + (1   r)t11F(EG
1B
D )]=[rt10 + (1   r)t11] (7)
and,
Pr(P appealjP loss) = [rt00F(EG
0B
P ) + (1   r)t01F(EG
1B
P )]=[rt00 + (1   r)t01] (8)
respectively.
Reversal Rates: The reversal rate of the defendants (the fraction of all defendant appeals
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: (9)
The numerator is the joint probability of a defendant appeal and a reversal and the denom-
inator is the marginal probability of defendant appeal. The reversal rate for the plaintis in
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: (10)
If the trial court is unbiased, but the litigants perceive a pro-plainti bias, then the reversal



















P ) + (1   r)t01F(EG1B
P )
(12)
for the defendants and plaintis, respectively. Using these expressions we have
Proposition 1 (Benchmark Case). If the litigants do not perceive the trial court as biased
and the case-mix is symmetric, then the trial win rates, appeal rates and the reversal rates
are the same for both the plaintis and the defendants.
Symmetric Case-mix but a Perception of Trial Court Bias by the Litigants
Now suppose that the litigants perceive a trial court bias, but all the other conditions remain
the same as in the benchmark case.8 As noted above, we allow for the perception of bias to
inuence the amount by which the litigants adjust their belief that the state is S0, when the
trial court rules against them. Denote by 0 = "0
D "0B
D and 1 = "1
D "1B
D the decrease in the
downward adjustment in belief of the defendants in state S0 and S1 respectively. Similarly,
denote by 0 = "0B
P   "0
P and 1 = "1B
P   "1
P the increase in the upward adjustment in belief
of the plaintis in state S0 and S1 respectively. Then we have the following.
Proposition 2. A perception by the litigants that the trial court has a pro-plainti bias
results in,
(a) a higher (resp. lower) appeal rate of the defendants (resp. plaintis).




























The intuition behind the proposition is the following. First, consider part (a). When the
trial court rules against the defendants (resp. plaintis), they adjust their prior belief that
S = S0 downwards (resp. upwards). This adjustment is smaller (resp. larger) when they
perceive the trial court as having a pro-plainti bias. Thus, with such a perception their
expected gain from appeal is higher (resp. lower), which results in more (resp. less) appeals.
The intuition behind part (b) is the following. As we see in part (a), the appeal rate of the
defendants goes up when they perceive the trial court as biased. If the appeal rate of the
defendants who deserve to win (\innocent" defendants) increases by a greater proportion
than that of those who deserve to lose (\guilty" defendants) then the reversal rate goes up.
This is what is expressed in inequality (13). Now for most distribution functions, f(x)=F(x)
8Eisenberg and Heise (2009) comment that \even if the trial court bias does not exist, appellate courts
may believe that such a bias exists ...[due to] persistent public characterizations of a \liability crisis"". If
this is true, then it seems reasonable to think that even the litigants may believe that such a bias exists.
Eisenberg and Heise (2009) do not consider this possibility.








D ). Hence, for the reversal
rate to increase with the perception of bias, we need 0 to be suciently larger than 1.
Here we outline a rationale for why 0 is likely to be greater than 1. In state S1, when
the correct outcome is that the defendant be deemed guilty, it is more likely that there
is sucient objective evidence against the defendant. Thus, according to the defendant,
any bias that he perceives is less likely to have been the deciding factor in the trial court's
decision making. Therefore, the adjustment in his belief about the state of nature, when the
trial court rules against him in state S1, will be similar whether or not he perceives the trial
court as biased, i.e., 1 will be small. On the other hand, in state S0 there is less likely to
be compelling evidence against the defendant. Therefore, when the trial court rules against
him and he perceives a bias, he is more likely to consider the bias as being a deciding factor.
Hence, the amount by which he adjusts his belief about the state of nature (when the trial
court rules against him in state S0) will be quite dierent depending upon whether or not
he perceives the trial court as biased, i.e., 0 will be relatively large.9
The intuition behind part (c) is similar to that behind part (b). For 1 suciently greater
than 0, the plainti reversal rate will be smaller when they perceive a pro-plainti bias.10
Taken together, propositions 1 and 2 suggest that when the litigants perceive the trial court
to be pro-plainti, the defendant appeal and reversal rates can be higher compared to those
of the plaintis. That is, it is possible that a perception of a pro-plainti bias, by the
litigants only, results in the same pattern that we observe in the data. Hence, the interpre-
tation in Eisenberg and Heise (2009) that this pattern is evidence of the appellate court's
\plaintiphobia" is not justied unless one can rule out this alternative explanation.
4. Conclusion
Data sets that follow a comprehensive cohort of court cases from the trial stage to their
conclusion at the appellate stage seem to oer new opportunities for empirical work on
attitudes and competency of adjudicators and litigants. In this paper we present a model
of the judicial process that can serve as a helpful tool in guiding such empirical work. We
demonstrate how the model can be used by studying the eect of litigants' perception that
the trial court has a pro-plainti bias on appeal rates and reversal rates. We nd that
such a perception results in a higher defendant appeal rate relative to that of the plaintis
and can also result in defendants having a higher reversal rate. Eisenberg and Heise(2009)
interpret the higher defendant reversal rate that is seen in the data as being evidence of a pro-
defendant bias at the appellate level. By showing that this pattern is consistent with another
9Proposition 2 and the above discussion would also be valid when tii < 1=2, provided we change assump-
tions (A.1)-(A.4) as mentioned in footnote 7 and redene i = "iB
D   "i
D and i = "i
P   "iB
P for i 2 f0;1g. In
this case, i would reect the increase (due to bias) in upward adjustment in the defendants' belief that the
state is S0 when the trial court rules against him in state Si. Analogous change applies to the interpretation
of i.
10A similar rationale as in the case of 0 and 1 can be given for why 1 is likely to be greater than 0.
A plainti's perception of the trial court is likely to play a bigger role in her adjustment of beliefs when the
evidence is more unclear. The parameter 1 corresponds to the change in adjustment when the trial court
makes an error (the state is S1 but the trial court rules in the defendant's favor), which is more likely to
happen when the evidence or rules are unclear.
7hypothesis, our model suggests that the conclusion drawn by Eisenberg and Heise(2009) does
not necessarily follow from the data.
The model presented here can be easily adapted to study how other factors, such as ac-
tual trial court bias, dierences in attitudes of juries and trial judges, dierences in their
competency, and asymmetric stakes of litigants can aect appeal rates and reversal rates.
We are currently working on some of these applications. In future work, the model can be
improved by allowing for settlement at the appellate stage, and also by explicitly considering
the litigation/settlement decision before the trial stage.
Appendix A: Proofs
Here we provide proofs of the propositions stated in the main body of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1
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and equation (3), this is the same as EG1
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r = 0:5), and the assumption t00 = t11, we have
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The second equality implies that trial win rate of the defendants and the plaintis is the same.
From the rst two equalities and expressions (5) and (6) it follows that Pr(D appealjD loss) =
Pr(P appealjP loss). Finally, from all the three equalities and expressions (9) and (10), it
follows that Pr(ReversaljD appeal) = Pr(ReversaljP appeal). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (a): Defendants' appeal rate













D +(a00  a01)1(H). Substituting these expressions in
equation (7) we have
Pr(D appealjD loss) =
rt10F(EG
0
D + (a00   a01)0(H)) + (1   r)t11F(EG
1
D + (a00   a01)1(H))
rt10 + (1   r)t11
(15)
Dierentiating (15) with respect to 0, we have
(d=d0)[Pr(D appealjD loss)] / rt10f(EG
0
D + (a00   a01)0(H))(a00   a01); (16)
8which is positive for a00 > 1=2. That is, the appeal rate increases as 0 increases. Similarly,
we can show that the appeal rate increases as 1 increases.
Part (a): Plaintis' appeal rate













P   1(a11   a10)H. Substituting these expressions in equation
(8) we have
Pr(P appealjP loss) =
rt00F(EG
0
P   0(a11   a10)H) + (1   r)t01F(EG
1
P   1(a11   a10)H)
rt00 + (1   r)t01
(17)
Dierentiating 17 with respect to 0, we have
(d=d0)[Pr(P appealjP loss)] / rt00f(EG
0
P   0(a11   a10)H)(a10   a11);
which is negative. That is, the plaintis' appeal rate falls as 0 increases. Similarly, we can
show that the appeal rate decreases as 1 increases.
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D + (a00   a01)0(H)) + (1   r)t11a01F(EG
1
D + (a00   a01)1(H))
rt10F(EG0
D + (a00   a01)0(H)) + (1   r)t11F(EG1
D + (a00   a01)1(H))
(18)
Totally dierentiating this expression with respect to 0 and 1, and using t10 = 1   t00,
t11 = t00, a01 = 1   a11 and a00 = a11 we have11
dPr(ReversaljD appeal) /

































P   1(a11   a10)H in




P   0(a11   a10)H)a10 + (1   r)t01F(EG
1
P   1(a11   a10)H)a11
rt00F(EG0
P   0(a11   a10)H) + (1   r)t01F(EG1
P   1(a11   a10)H)
(20)
11We have set di = i;(i 2 f0;1g) in expression (19).
9Totally dierentiating this expression with respect to 0 and 1 and using t01 = 1   t11,
t11 = t00, a10 = 1   a00 and a11 = a00 we have
dPr(ReversaljP appeal) /

























The patterns in the data that we refer to in the main body are based on the Supplemental
Survey of Civil Appeals, 2001. Here we show the summary statistics pertaining to the trial
win rates, appeal rates and reversal rates of the defendants and the plaintis from this data
set. These statistics are the same as those used by Eisenberg and Heise (2009) to motivate
their hypothesis that appellate courts exhibit \plaintiphobia".
Of the initial 8,038, we eliminated 165 civil trial cases in which both litigants appealed. We
eliminated 10 cases for which the trial outcome was missing. This gives a total of 7,863
cases. The trial win rate for the defendants is dened as (Total # of Trials Won by the
Defendant)/(Total # of Trials). The trial win rate of the plaintis is similarly dened. Of
the 7,863 trials, 991 (12.6%) were appealed. As Table 1 shows, the appeal rate for the
defendants is higher than that of the plaintis. The appeal rate for defendants is dened as
Defendant Appeal Rate =
Total # of Defendant Appeals
Total # of Cases in which Defendants Lose
(22)
The appeal rate for the plaintis is similarly dened. The defendants brought 573 (57.8%)
of the 991 cases appealed.
We categorize a case as being reversed if it was \reversed in whole" or \reversed in part" or
\remanded" or \armed in part". The reversal rate for the defendants is dened as
Defendant Reversal Rate =
Total # of Defendant Appeals Reversed
Total # of Defendant Appeals
(23)
The reversal rate for the plaintis is similarly dened.
10Table 1: Trial win, appeal and reversal rates of Defendants and Plain-
tis
Party Trial Win Rate Appeal Rate Reversal Rate
Defendants 46.3 13.6 34.3
Plaintis 53.7 11.5 23.7
p-valuea 0.000 0.000 0.000
ap-value is the probability value for the t-test of the dierence between the
defendant and the plainti rates.
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